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PROPOSITIONAL DYNAMIC LOGIC FOR SEARCHING
GAMES WITH ERRORS
BRUNO TEHEUX
Abstract. We investigate some finitely-valued generalizations of pro-
positional dynamic logic with tests. We start by introducing the n+ 1-
valued Kripke models and a corresponding language based on a modal
extension of Łukasiewicz many-valued logic. We illustrate the defini-
tions by providing a framework for an analysis of the Rényi - Ulam
searching game with errors.
Our main result is the axiomatization of the theory of the n + 1-
valued Kripke models. This result is obtained through filtration of the
canonical model of the smallest n+1-valued propositional dynamic logic.
1. Introduction
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is a multi-modal logic designed to rea-
son about programs. The general idea behind the semantic of this system is
the following. Program states are gathered in a set W . Any program α is
encoded by its input/output relation on W . Programs are built from atomic
ones and test operators using regular operations. Their associated relations
are defined as to respect this algebra of programs. The goal is to provide a
framework for formal verification through input/output specifications.
Since its introduction by Fischer and Ladner in [9], the scope of dy-
namic logic has widened to many other areas such as game theory (see
[12, 18, 27]), epistemic logic (see [32]) or natural language (see [31]). The
subject is under constant and active development (see [1, 2, 8, 19] for exam-
ple) and we refer to [17] for an introductory monograph.
Informally, PDL is a mixture of modal logic and algebra of regular pro-
grams. Recently, some authors have considered generalizations of modal
logics to many-valued realms (see [3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 24]). These modal many-
valued systems can naturally be considered as building blocks of many-valued
generalizations of PDL. In other words, these developments raise the issue
of describing the systems obtained by adding a many-valued flavor to the
modal logic used to define PDL. Such many-valued propositional dynamic
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logics would provide a language to state correctness criteria in the form of
input/output specifications that could be partly satisfied.
We address this problem for the modal extensions of the n + 1-valued
Łukasiewicz logics (see [20, 21, 22]) studied in [15, 16]. Hence, the truth
values of the propositions range in a set of finite cardinality n + 1 where
n ≥ 1.
Our starting point is the definition of a language (with test operator) for
such generalizations and their corresponding n + 1-valued Kripke models.
In these models, relations associated to programs are crisp and valuation
maps are many-valued. As an illustration of the new possibilities allowed by
this language, we explain how it can be used to construct a dynamic model
for formal verification of strategies of the Rényi - Ulam searching game
with errors.
The goal of this paper is the characterization of the theory of these n+1-
valued Kripke models (i.e., the set of formulas that are true in any model).
In this view, Theorem 5.13 is our main result. It gives an axiomatization of
this theory through an n+1-valued propositional dynamic deductive system
that we denote by PDLn.
This result is obtained by the way of the canonical model. This construc-
tion defects to be a ‘standard’ n + 1-valued Kripke model and we need a
filtration result to obtain Theorem 5.13.
The construction of the canonical model for PDL is algebraic in disguise.
This model is built upon the set of the maximal filters of the Lindenbaum -
Tarski algebra of PDL which is a multi-modal Boolean algebra. Naturally,
the canonical model for PDLn also has an algebraic flavor. The system PDLn
is based on modal extensions of Łukasiewicz n + 1-valued logic. Hence,
MV-algebras - which are the algebraic counterpart of Łukasiewicz logics -
replace Boolean algebras in this setting.
The techniques used in the proofs in this paper are generalizations of the
corresponding techniques for PDL. It is worth noting that by considering
n = 1, our results boil down to the existing ones for PDL.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce some
many-valued generalizations of the language and models of PDL. Section 3
provides an example that illustrates the possibilities offered by these gen-
eralizations. Section 4 is devoted to the development of a sound deductive
system PDLn for the n+ 1-valued Kripke models. The many-valued forms
of the intrinsic axioms of PDL, such as the induction axiom, are discussed
when needed. Eventually, in section 5 we prove the deductive complete-
ness of PDLn with respect to the n+ 1-valued Kripke-models (proof of the
filtration lemma is provided in Appendix). In order to keep the paper self-
contained, we recall the necessary definitions and results about algebras of
regular programs and MV-algebras.
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2. Many-valued Kripke models for dynamic logics
The starting point of the developments of this paper is a generalization
to an n + 1-valued realm of the definitions of the propositional dynamic
language and the Kripke models.
Let us denote by Π0 a nonempty set of atomic programs (denoted by
a, b, . . .) and by Prop a countable set of propositional variables (denoted by
p, q, . . .). The sets Π of programs and of well formed formulas are given
by the following Backus-Naur forms (where φ are formulas and α are
programs) :
(2.1)
φ ::= p | 0 | ¬φ | φ→ φ | [α]φ
α ::= a | φ? | α;α | α ∪ α | α∗.
To extend the definition of a Kripke model to a [0, 1]-valued realm, we
use Łukasiewicz interpretation →[0,1] and ¬[0,1] of the binary connector →
and the unary connector ¬ respectively. These maps are defined on [0, 1] by
(2.2) ¬[0,1]x = 1− x and x→[0,1] y = min(1− x+ y, 1).
Hence, (2.2) allows us to define in the obvious inductive way the [0, 1]-
interpretation τ [0,1] of any well formed formula τ constructed only with
propositional variables and connectives ¬ and → (if τ has k propositional
variables then τ [0,1] : [0, 1]k → [0, 1]). To shorten notation, when no confu-
sion is possible we usually denote by ¬, → and τ the maps ¬[0,1], →[0,1] and
τ [0,1] respectively.
The results we are interested in are related to finitely-valued Łukasiewicz
logics. It means that we only allow valuations of propositional variables in
the finite subsets of [0, 1] that are closed for the connectors ¬ and → (and
that contain 0 and 1). It is not difficult to realize that these are exactly the
subsets Łn = {
i
n | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} where n is an integer greater than 1 (see [7]
for details). If τ is a formula constructed from k propositional variables by
using only connectives ¬ and →, we denote by τŁn the restriction of τ [0,1] to
Łkn.
Recall that if R and R′ are unary relations on W then the composition
R ◦ R′ is defined by R ◦ R′ = {(u,w) ∈ W ×W | ∃v ∈ W (uRv & vR′w)}.
Moreover, the k-th power Rk of R is inductively defined by R0 = {(u, u) |
u ∈W} and Rk+1 = R ◦Rk for k ∈ ω.
Definition 2.1. An n + 1-valued Kripke model M = 〈W,R,Val〉 is given
by a nonempty set W , a map R : Π0 → 2
W×W that assigns a binary relation
Ra to any a ∈ Π0 and a map Val : W ×Prop→ Łn that assigns a truth value
to any propositional variable p of Prop in any world w of W .
The maps R and Val are extended by mutual induction to formulas and
programs by the following rules:
(1) Rα;β = Rα ◦Rβ ;
(2) Rα∪β = Rα ∪Rβ;
(3) Rψ? = {(u, u) | Val(u, ψ) = 1};
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(4) Rα∗ =
⋃
k∈ω(Rα)
k;
(5) Val(w, 0) = 0;
(6) Val(w,φ→ ψ) = Val(w,φ)→[0,1] Val(w,ψ);
(7) Val(w,¬ψ) = ¬[0,1]Val(w,ψ);
(8) Val(w, [α]ψ) =
∧
{Val(v, ψ) | (w, v) ∈ Rα}.
Throughout the paper, n stands for a fixed integer greater or equal to 1.
We sometimes call Kripke model an n+ 1-valued Kripke model.
Clearly, we intend to interpret the operator ‘;’ as the concatenation pro-
gram operator, ‘∪’ as the alternative program operator and the operator
‘∗’ as the Kleene program operator. Hence, if α and β are programs, the
connective [α] is read ‘after any execution of α’, the connective [α ∪ β] is
read ‘after any execution of α or β’, the connective [α;β] is read ‘after any
execution of α followed by an execution of β’ and [α∗] is read ‘after an un-
determined number of executions of α’ (rule (4) means that Rα∗ is defined
as the transitive and reflexive closure of Rα).
Definition 2.2. If w is a world of a Kripke model M and if φ is a formula
such that Val(w,φ) = 1, we write M, w |= φ and say that φ is true in w. If
φ is a formula that is true in each world of a model M then φ is true in M.
A formula that is true in every Kripke model is called a tautology.
We use of the well established following abbreviations for any φ,ψ ∈: the
formula φ∨ψ stands for (φ→ ψ)→ ψ, the formula φ∧ψ for ¬(¬φ∨¬ψ), the
formula φ⊕ ψ for ¬φ→ ψ, the formula φ⊙ ψ for ¬(¬φ⊕ ¬ψ), the formula
φ↔ ψ for (φ→ ψ)⊙ (ψ → φ). Moreover, we assume associativity of ⊕ and
⊙ (this is justified by associativity of ⊕[0,1] and ⊙[0,1]). Hence, the formula
k.ψ and ψk (k ∈ ω) stands respectively for ψ⊕· · ·⊕ψ and ψ⊙· · ·⊙ψ where
the factor ψ is repeated k times. We adopt the convention that ψ0 = 1 and
0.ψ = 0. It is easily checked that the resulting [0, 1]-interpretations of these
abbreviations are the following:
(1) x⊕[0,1] y = min{x+ y, 1},
(2) x⊙[0,1] y = max{x+y−1, 0},
(3) x↔[0,1] y = 1− | x− y |,
(4) x ∨[0,1] y = max{x, y},
(5) x ∧[0,1] y = min{x, y}.
In Łukasiewicz logic, connectors ⊕ and ⊙ are respectively called strong
disjunction and strong conjunction because the equations (p⊙ q)[0,1] ≤ (p ∧
q)[0,1] and (p ⊕ q)[0,1] ≥ (p ∨ q)[0,1] are satisfied. Recall that ⊙[0,1] is a left-
continuous t-norm with residuum ¬[0,1]. This means that equation
(2.3)
(
(p ⊙ (p→ q))→ q
)[0,1]
= 1,
which can be considered as the fuzzy version of modus ponens, is satisfied.
It should be noted that (pk+1)[0,1] 6= (pk)[0,1] for any k ∈ ω but (pk+1)Łn =
(pk)Łn for every k ≥ n. Finally, the formula 〈α〉φ stands for ¬[α]¬φ.
Moreover, we write M, w |= Γ (respectively M |= Γ) if Γ is a set of
formulas that are true in w (respectively in M).
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Proposition 2.3. The following formulas are tautologies for any programs
α and β (where n is the integer that we have fixed to define Łn).
(1) [α ∪ β]p↔ [α]p ∧ [β]p.
(2) [α;β]p↔ [α][β]p.
(3) 〈α ∪ β〉p↔ 〈α〉p ∨ 〈β〉p.
(4) 〈α;β〉p ↔ 〈α〉〈β〉p.
(5) [q?]p↔ (¬qn ∨ p).
(6) [α∗]p→ p.
(7) p→ 〈α∗〉p.
(8) [α∗]p→ [α]p.
(9) 〈α〉p→ 〈α∗〉p.
(10) [α∗]p↔ (p ∧ [α][α∗]p).
(11) 〈α∗〉p↔ (p ∨ 〈α〉〈α∗〉p).
(12) (p∧[α∗](p→ [α]p)n)→ [α∗]p.
(13) [α∗]p→ [α∗][α∗]p.
Moreover, the following formulas are tautologies for any program α, be-
cause they are tautologies of the modal n+ 1-valued Łukasiewicz logic.
(14) [α](p→ q)→ ([α]p→ [α]q).
(15) [α](p ∧ q)↔ [α]p ∧ [α]q and 〈α〉(p ∨ q)↔ 〈α〉p ∨ 〈α〉q.
(16) ([α]p ∨ [α]q)→ [α](p ∨ q).
(17) ([α]φ⊙ 〈α〉ψ) → 〈α〉(φ ⊙ ψ).
(18) 〈α〉(φ ⊙ ψ)→ (〈α〉φ ⊙ 〈α〉ψ)
(19) If τ(q) is a formula with a single variable q which is constructed
only with the connectors ¬ and → and whose [0, 1]-interpretation is
increasing then τ([α]p)↔ [α]τ(p) and τ(〈α〉p)↔ 〈α〉τ(p).
Example 2.4. It is worth noting that the formula
(
p∧[α∗](p→ [α]p)
)
→ [α∗]p
is not a tautology. It would have been the most natural many-valued gen-
eralization of the Induction Axiom of PDL. As a counterexample, consider
the model M = 〈{u, v}, R,Val〉 where Ra = {(u, v)}, Val(u, p) = 3/4 and
Val(v, p) = 1/4. It follows that on the one hand Val(u, [a∗]p) = Val(u, p) ∧
Val(v, p) = 1/4. On the other hand, we obtain successively
Val(u, [α∗](p→ [α]p)) = Val(u, p→ [a]p) ∧Val(v, p→ [a]p)(2.4)
= 1/2 ∧ 1(2.5)
= 1/2.(2.6)
It follows that Val(u, p ∧ [α∗](p → [α]p)) = 3/4 ∧ 1/2 = 1/2 6= 1/4 =
Val(u, [a∗]p).
3. An illustration, the Rényi - Ulam game
We can use the previously defined models to provide a framework for an
analysis of the famous Rényi - Ulam game. Ulam’s formulation of the
game in [29], which was previously and independently introduced by Rényi,
is the following:
Someone thinks of a number between one and one million
(which is just less than 220). Another person is allowed to
ask up to twenty questions, to each of which the first person
is supposed to answer only yes or no. Obviously the number
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can be guessed by asking first: is the number in the first half-
million? and again reduce the reservoir of numbers in the
next question by one-half, and so-on. Finally, the number is
obtained in less than log2 1000000. Now, suppose that one
were allowed to lie once or twice, then how many questions
would one need to get the right answer?
Many researchers (mainly computer scientists) have focused their atten-
tion on that game since the publication of Ulam’s book [29]. The success
of the game is due to its connections with the theory of error-correcting
codes with feedbacks in a noisy channel and the complexity of the problem
of defining optimal strategies for the game. We refer to [28] for an overview
of the literature about the Rényi - Ulam game.
The game has also been considered by many-valued logicians as a way
to give a concrete interpretation of Łukasiewicz finitely-valued calculi and
their associated algebras (see [23]). Mathematicians have modeled the game
by coding algebraically questions and answers. We recall this model, which
is due to Mundici, and then build a dynamic layer upon it in order to model
the interactions between the two gamers.
3.1. Algebraic approach of the states of knowledge. We call the first
gamer (the one who chooses a number and can lie) Pinocchio, and the second
gamer Geppetto. Let us denote by M the search space, i.e., the finite set of
integers (or whatever) in which Pinocchio can pick up his number. Let us
also assume that Pinocchio can lie n− 1 times.
We set up a way to algebraically encode the information defined by Pinoc-
chio’s answers, i.e., to model Geppetto’s state of knowledge of the game after
each of Pinocchio’s answers. This can be done by considering at step i of
the game (after i answers) the map ri : M → {0, 1, . . . , n} where ri(m) is
the number of the i previous answers that refute the element m of M as
Pinocchio’s number. Indeed, once r(m) = n, since Pinocchio is allowed to
lie n− 1 times, Geppetto can safely conclude that m is not the ‘right’ num-
ber. Hence, the game ends once Geppetto encodes its knowledge by a map
r which is equal to n in any element m of M but in the searched number.
In order to introduce Łukasiewicz language in the interpretation of the
game, we consider an equivalent representation of Geppetto’s states of knowl-
edge. This approach was introduced in [23].
Definition 3.1. A state of knowledge is a map f : M → Łn. The state of
knowledge f at some step of the game is defined by f(m) = 1− r(m)n where
r(m) denotes for any m in M the number of Pinocchio’s answers that refute
m as the searched number.
Hence, informally speaking, if f is a state of knowledge at some step of
the game, the number f(m) can be viewed for any m in M as the relative
distance between m and the set of the elements of M that can be safely
discarded as inappropriate.
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3.2. Questions and answers. Note that during the game any question is
equivalent to a question of the form ‘Does the searched number belong to
Q?’ for a subset Q of the search space M . Hence, for the remainder of this
section, we denote any question by its associated subset Q of M .
Let us assume that Geppetto has reached the state of knowledge f and
that he asks question Q. What is the state of knowledge f ′ of the game
after Pinocchio’s answer? If Pinocchio answers positively (‘Yes, the number
belongs to Q’) then Gepetto increments r(m) by one (if necessary) for any
m in M \Q since a positive answer to Q is equivalent to a negative answer
to M \Q, i.e.,
(3.1) f ′ : M → Łn = m 7→
{
f(m) if m ∈ Q
max{f(m)− 1m , 0} if m ∈M \Q.
On the contrary, if Pinocchio answers negatively to Q, then Gepetto incre-
ments r(m) by one (if necessary) for any m in Q, i.e.,
(3.2) f ′ :M → Łn = m 7→
{
f(m) if m ∈M \Q
max{f(m)− 1m , 0} if m ∈ Q.
This line of argument justifies the following definition.
Definition 3.2. If Q is a subset of M , the positive answer to Q is the map
fQ :M → {
n− 1
n
, 1} : m 7→
{
1 if m ∈ Q
n−1
n if m ∈M \Q.
The negative answer to Q is the positive answer fM\Q to M \Q.
We can thus encode algebraically any of Pinocchio’s answers. Recall that
the interpretation of the binary connector ⊙ on [0, 1] is defined by x⊙[0,1]y =
max(x+ y − 1, 0).
Fact 3.3. Assume that Geppetto has reached the state of knowledge f and
that he asks question Q. After Pinocchio’s answer to Q, the stage of knowl-
edge f ′ of the game is f ⊙ fQ if Pinocchio’s answer is positive and f ⊙ fM\Q
if it is negative.
3.3. A dynamic layer. Roughly speaking, we have modeled the game in a
static way. There is no structure to model the possible sequences of states of
games. We provide such a structure through the Question/Answer relations
on the set of the states of knowledge. The atomic programs are the possible
questions, i.e. Π0 = 2
M . The set of propositional variables {pm | m ∈ M}
that are relevant to the problem is made of a variable pm for any m in M
that can be read as ‘m is far from the set of rejected element’ or ‘the relative
distance between m and the set of rejected elements is’.
Definition 3.4. The model of the Rényi - Ulam game with search space
M and n−1 lies is the n+1-valued Kripke modelM = 〈ŁMn , R,Val〉 where
(1) for any Q in 2M , the relation RQ contains (f, f
′) if f ′ = f ⊙ fQ or if
f ′ = f ⊙ fM\Q,
(2) for any m in M and any f in ŁMn , we set Val(f, pm) = f(m).
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This model provides a way to interpret any run of the game as a path
from the initial state f : m 7→ 1 to any final winning state.
Example 3.5. Examples of formulas that state correctness specifications for
‘honest’ sequences of states of knowledge include the following. We denote by
τi/n(p) a formula whose interpretation on Łn is valued in {0, 1} and satifies
τŁni/n(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ≥ i/n. See Definition 4.3 for a formal definition.
(1) [Q]pm → pm
(2) τ i
n
(pm) → [Q;M \ Q]τ i−2
n
(pm) (if we agree that τ i−2
n
(pm) = 1 if
i− 2 ≤ 0).
As mentioned in the introduction, it is not the purpose of this paper to
push further the investigation of the new possibilities allowed by the n+ 1-
valued Kripke models. Nevertheless, we give some ideas of possible appli-
cations in section 6.
4. n+ 1-valued propositional dynamic logics
We aim to provide a set of rules that allow to syntacticly generate the
theory of the n+ 1-valued Kripke models defined in section 2. The under-
lying modal system on which we base the following definition is the modal
Łn-valued logic introduced in [15, 16].
Definition 4.1. An n + 1-valued propositional dynamic logic (or simply
a logic) is a subset L of that is closed under the rules of modus ponens,
uniform substitution and necessitation (generalization) and that contains
the following axioms:
(1) tautologies of the n+ 1-valued Łukasiewicz logic;
(2) for any program α, axioms defining modality [α]:
(a) [α](p→ q)→ ([α]p→ [α]q),
(b) [α](p ⊕ p)↔ [α]p ⊕ [α]p,
(c) [α](p ⊙ p)↔ [α]p ⊙ [α]p,
(3) the axioms that define the program operations: for any programs α
and β;
(a) [α ∪ β]p↔ [α]p ∧ [β]p,
(b) [α;β]p ↔ [α][β]p,
(c) [q?]p↔ (¬qn ∨ p),
(d) [α∗]p↔ (p ∧ [α][α∗]p),
(e) [α∗]p→ [α∗][α∗]p,
(4) the induction axiom
(
p ∧ [α∗](p → [α]p)n
)
→ [α∗]p for any program
α.
We denote by PDLn the smallest n+ 1-valued propositional dynamic logic.
As usual, a formula φ that belongs to a logic L is called a theorem of L
and we often write ⊢ φ instead of φ ∈ PDLn.
Note that formulas of item (2) of Definition 4.1 are tautologies according
to items (14) and (19) of Proposition 2.3. Similarily, formulas in (3) and (4)
of Definition 4.1 are formulas (1), (2), (5), (10), (12), (13) of Proposition 2.3.
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Remark 4.2. Note that conditions (1) and (2) and the deduction rules of
Definition 4.1 together with deductive completeness for the modal Łn-valued
logic (see Theorem 6.2 in [16]) ensure that if ψ is a tautology of the modal
Łn-valued Łukasiewicz logic and if α ∈ Π then the formula obtained from
ψ by substitution of any occurrence of  by [α] is a theorem of PDLn.
Informally, the induction axiom (4) means ‘if after an undetermined num-
ber of executions of α the truth value of p cannot decrease after a new
execution of α, then the truth value of p cannot decrease after any unde-
termined number of executions of α’. Hence, it is a natural generalization
of the induction axiom of PDL (which could not have been adopted without
modification according to Example 2.4).
Let us introduce some notations in order to comment the axioms [α](p ⊕
p)↔ ([α]p ⊕ [α]p) and [α](p ⊙ p)↔ ([α]p ⊙ [α]p).
Definition 4.3. Let i be an element of {1, . . . , n}. We denote by τi/n a
composition (fixed throughout the paper) of the formulas p ⊕ p and p ⊙ p
whose interpretation on Łn is defined by τ
Łn
i/n
(x) = 0 if x < in and τ
Łn
i/n
(x) = 1
if x ≥ in (see [24] for the existence and the construction of such formulas).
For any i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we denote by Ii/n the formula τi/n ∧ ¬τ(i+1)/n
(where we set τ(n+1)/n = τ0/n = p⊕ ¬p).
Hence, the interpretation on Łn of Ii/n is the characteristic function of
{ in}. The following result is a consequence of deductive completeness for
modal Łn-valued Łukasiewicz logic (see [16]).
Fact 4.4. In the definition of PDLn, for any α ∈ Π, the pair of axioms
(4.1) {[α](p ⋆ p)↔ ([α]p ⋆ [α]p) | ⋆ ∈ {⊙,⊕}}
can be equivalently replaced by the axioms
(4.2) {[α]τi/n(p)↔ τi/n([α]p) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
Hence, informally speaking, the content of the pair of axioms {[α](p⋆p) ↔
([α]p ⋆ [α]p) | ⋆ ∈ {⊙,⊕}} is essentially the following.
For any i ≤ n, the truth value of the statement ‘after any
execution of α, formula φ holds’ is at least in if and only if it
holds that ‘after any execution of α the truth value of φ is at
least in ’ .
Proposition 2.3 states that the axioms of PDLn are tautologies. Tautolo-
gies are preserved by application of the deduction rules. It follows that any
theorem of PDLn is a tautology.
As an illustration of Definition 4.1, we prove that PDLn is closed under
a loop invariance rule. We say that a rule of inference is derivable in PDLn
if its consequence can be obtained from its premises by application of rules
and axiom schemes of PDLn.
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Lemma 4.5. For any α ∈ Π, the rule
(LI)
(φ→ [α]φ)n
(φ→ [α∗]φ)
is derivable in PDLn.
Proof. Assume that ⊢ (φ→ [α]φ)n. Then
⊢ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n(4.3)
⊢ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n →
(
φ→ (φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n)
)
(4.4)
where (4.3) is obtained by generalization and 4.4 by the fact that p→ (t→
(p∧ t)) is a tautology of the n+1-valued Łukasiewicz logic (and we apply
substitution p := [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n and t := φ). It follows that
⊢ φ→ (φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n)(4.5)
⊢ φ→ [α∗]φ(4.6)
where (4.5) is obtained by modus ponens and (4.6) by double modus po-
nens and induction axiom applied to the tautology of the n + 1-valued
Łukasiewicz logic (p → q) → ((q → t) → (p → t)) with substitution
p := φ, q := φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n and t := [α∗]φ. 
Remark 4.6. We say that a rule of inference RI is admissible in PDLn if the
system formed by PDLn and RI has the same theorems as PDLn. Since for
any k ∈ ω the rule φ/φk is admissible in Łukasiewicz n + 1-valued logic,
we can deduce from Lemma 4.5 that the rule
(LI♯)
(φ→ [α]φ)
(φ→ [α∗]φ)
is admissible in PDLn.
5. Deductive Completeness for PDLn
The main result of the paper is Theorem 5.13 that states that PDLn is
complete with respect to the n + 1-valued Kripke models. To obtain this
result, we use the technique of the canonical model. We follow Part II of [17]
to guide us in our constructions and developments.
As in the case of propositional dynamic logic, in the construction of the
canonical model for PDLn , the relation associated to a program is not built
inductively from the relations associated to its atomic programs. Instead,
we directly associate to each α of Π a relation Rα defined in a canonical
way. In fact, the inductive rules involving the operators ‘;’, ‘∪’ and ‘?’ are
satisfied in the canonical model, but Rα∗ may strictly contain the transitive
and reflexive closure of Rα. We use the technique of filtration to construct
Łn-valued Kripke models from this canonical model.
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5.1. Filtration lemma. The canonical model of PDLn will turn out to be
non standard in the following sense.
Definition 5.1. A weak non standard n + 1-valued Kripke model M =
〈W,R,Val〉 is given by a nonempty set W a map R : Π → 2W×W and a
valuation map Val : W × Prop → Łn. The valuation map is extended to
formulas by way of the rules (6), (7) and (8) of Definition 2.1. If w ∈W and
φ ∈, we write M, w |= φ if Val(w,φ) = 1. We write M |= φ if M, w |= φ for
any w in W .
A non standard n+1-valued Kripke model is a weak non standard n+1-
valued Kripke model M = 〈W,R,Val〉 such that for any programs α and
β and any formula ψ,
(1) the following identities are satisfied in M:
(a) Rα;β = Rα ◦Rβ,
(b) Rα∪β = Rα ∪Rβ,
(c) Rψ? = {(u, u) | Val(u, ψ) = 1};
(2) the relation R∗α is a transitive and reflexive extension of Rα;
(3) For any φ ∈, M |= {[α∗]φ → (φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ), [α∗]φ → [α∗][α∗]φ, (φ ∧
[α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n)→ [α∗]φ}.
Note that in condition (2) of the previous definition we allow Rα∗ to be
any reflexive and transitive extension of Rα.
Remark 5.2. Conditions (1) and (3) ensure that if φ is a theorem of PDLn
then M |= φ for any n+1-valued non standard Kripke model M (because
axioms and rules of PDLn are sound for non standard Kripke frames).
Filtration lemmas are usually proved by induction on the subformula re-
lation. In (n + 1-valued) propositional dynamic logic, the use of induction
is somehow cumbersome because of the interdependence of the definitions of
formulas and programs. We use the Fischer - Ladner closure FL(φ) of a
formula φ to prove a filtration lemma for n+1-valued non standard models.
To ease readability, proof of the Filtration Lemma is moved in Appendix in
which we also recall the definition (Definition A.1) of the Fisher - Ladner
closure of a formula (see also [17]) .
Definition 5.3. If M = 〈W,R,Val〉 is a weak n + 1-valued non standard
Kripke model and if φ is a formula then we define the equivalence relation
≡φ on W by
(5.1) u ≡φ v if ∀ψ ∈ FL(φ) Val(u, ψ) = Val(v, ψ).
We denote by [W ]φ (or simply by [W ]) the quotient of W by ≡φ and by
[u]φ (or simply [u]) the class of an element u of W for ≡φ.
Then, for any atomic program a of Π0 we define the relation R
[M]φ
a by
(5.2) R
[M]φ
a = {([u], [v]) | (u, v) ∈ Ra}
and the valuation map Val[W ] on [W ]× Prop by
(5.3) Val[M]φ([u], p) =
∨
Val([u], p).
12 BRUNO TEHEUX
The n+ 1-valued Kripke model [M]φ = 〈[W ]φ, R
[M]φ ,Val[M]φ〉 is called
the filtration of M through φ. If no confusion is possible we prefer to denote
this model by [M] = 〈[W ], R[M],Val[M]〉.
Note that the number of worlds in [M]φ is finite and bounded by (n +
1)|FL(φ)|.
The proof of the following result is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 5.4 (Filtration). Assume that M = 〈W,R,Val〉 is an n+ 1-valued
non standard Kripke model and that φ is a formula.
(1) If ψ is in FL(φ) then Val(u, ψ) = Val[M]([u], ψ).
(2) For every [α]ψ in FL(φ),
(a) if (u, v) ∈ Rα then ([u], [v]) ∈ R
[M]
α ;
(b) if ([u], [v]) ∈ R
[M]
α then Val(u, [α]ψ) ≤ Val(v, ψ).
We obtain the decidability of the satisfiability problem for PDLn as an
immediate consequence of Lemma 5.4.
Definition 5.5. A formula φ of is satisfiable if there is an n + 1-valued
Kripke model and a world in this model in which φ is true.
Corollary 5.6. The problem of deciding if a formula of is satisfiable is
decidable.
Proof. If φ is satisfiable in an n+1-valued Kripke model, Lemma 5.4 ensures
that it is satisfiable in a model with at most (n + 1)|FL(φ)| worlds. 
5.2. The canonical model. We construct the canonical n+1-valued Kri-
pke model of PDLn on the set of homomorphisms from the Lindenbaum -
Tarski algebra of PDLn to Łn. We assume that the reader has some ac-
quaintance with the theory of MV-algebras which are the algebras of the
many-valued Łukasiewicz logics. We only recall the necessary definitions.
See [14] for an introduction or [7] for a monograph on the subject.
Recall that the variety MV of MV-algebras is generated by the algebra
〈[0, 1],→,¬, 1〉 where ¬ and → are defined on [0, 1] as their Łukasiewicz
interpretation (see section 2). MV can be described as the class of algebras
A = 〈A,→,¬, 1〉 of type (2, 1, 0) that satisfy the following equations1:
(5.4)
x→ 1 = x, (x→ y)→ ((y → z)→ (x→ z))=1,
(x→)→ y = (y → x)→ x, (¬x→ ¬y)→ (y → x) = 1.
The variety MVn is the subvariety of MV generated by the subalgebra
Łn of [0, 1]. We denote by MV(A,Łn) the set of the MV-algebra homomor-
phisms from A to Łn for any A ∈ MVn.
In any MV-algebra A, the relation ≤ defined by a ≤ b if a → b = 1 is a
bounded distributive lattice order on A. The varietyMV was introduced by
Chang (see [5, 6]) in order to obtain an algebraic completeness result for
Łukasiewicz infinite-valued logic.
1This axiomatization is not the most commonly used axiomatization of MV, but it is
the most efficient for our purpose. See [7] for details.
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Definition 5.7. We denote by Fn the Lindenbaum - Tarski algebra of
PDLn, that is, the quotient of by the syntactic equivalence relation ≡ defined
by φ ≡ ψ if PDLn ⊢ φ ↔ ψ. This quotient is equipped with the operations
→, ¬ and [α] (α ∈ Π) defined in the obvious way: (φ/ ≡)→ (ψ/ ≡) = (φ→
ψ)/ ≡, ¬(ψ/ ≡) = (¬ψ)/ ≡ and [α](ψ/ ≡) = ([α]ψ)/ ≡.
For the sake of readability, we prefer to denote by φ the class φ/ ≡.
Lemma 5.8. The reduct of Fn to the language {→,¬, 1} belongs to MVn.
Proof. We have included the tautologies of Łukasiewicz n+1-valued logic
in our axiomatization of PDLn. 
The preceding lemma leads to the definition of the canonical model for
PDLn. The classical construction of the canonical model for PDL is based
on the set of the maximal (Boolean) filters of the Lindenbaum - Tarski
algebra F of PDL. One of the key element of this construction is a separation
result (a consequence of the Ultrafilter Theorem) that states that for any φ,ψ
such that φ,ψ, φ ↔ ψ 6∈ PDL, there is a maximal filter of F that contains
φ/ ≡ but not ψ/ ≡. We can state this result using homomorphisms. Indeed,
a subset F of a Boolean algebra A is a (proper) maximal filter if and only
if the map πF : A → 2 (where 2 denotes the two element Boolean algebra)
defined by π−1F (1) = F is an homomorphism. Hence, the separation result
can be stated in this way: for any φ,ψ such that φ,ψ, φ ↔ ψ 6∈ PDL, there
is an homomorphism v : F → 2 such that v(φ) = 1 and v(ψ) = 0.
There is an analogous separation result for the varietyMVn: if A ∈MVn
and a 6= b ∈ A, there is an homomorphism v : A→ Łn such that
2 v(a) 6= v(b).
This result, together with Lemma 5.8, indicates that the set MV(Fn,Łn) is
a good candidate for the universe of the canonical model of PDLn. Before
proceeding with the construction of this model, let us recall howMV(A,Łn)
is linked with the set of maximal filters of A ∈ MVn.
A filter of an MV-algebra A is a subset F of A that contains 1 and that
contains y whenever it contains x and x→ y. Equivalently, a filter of A is a
nonempty increasing subset of A closed under ⊙. If X is a nonempty subset
of an MV-algebra A, the filter generated by X is the filter
(5.5) 〈X〉 = {b ∈ A | ∃k ∈ ω, ǫ ∈ ωk, x ∈ Xk(b ≥ xǫ11 ⊙ · · · ⊙ x
ǫk
k )}.
Filters are ordered by set inclusion and the proper maximal elements are
called maximal filters and correspond to homomorphisms from A to Łn in
the following way. For any maximal filter F of A ∈ MVn, there is only
one homomorphism vF : A → Łn that satisfies v
−1
F (1) = F . The map
v· : F 7→ vF has converse ·
−1(1) : v 7→ v−1(1) that associates a maximal
filter for any v ∈ A(A,Łn).
Definition 5.9. The canonical model of PDLn is defined as the modelM
c =
〈W c, Rc,Valc〉 where
2Without going into details, note that this is a consequence of the characterization of
subdirectly irreducible elements of MVn. See [7].
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(1) W c =MV(Fn,Łn);
(2) if α ∈ Π, the relation Rcα is defined as
Rcα = {(u, v) | ∀φ ∈ Fn
(
u([α]φ) = 1⇒ v(φ) = 1
)
};
(3) the map Valc is defined as
Valc : W c× : (u, φ) 7→ u(φ).
When no confusion arises, we prefer to write W , R and Val instead of W c,
Rc and Valc respectively.
Lemma 5.10. If α ∈ Π, then
(5.6) Rcα = {(u, v) | ∀φ ∈ Fn(v(φ) = 1⇒ u(〈α〉φ) = 1)}.
Proof. Assume that (u, v) ∈ Rcα and that φ is an element of Fn such that
v(φ) = 1. If u(〈α〉φ) < 1 then u([α]¬φ) = 1 − u(〈α〉φ) > 0. Let i be
the element of {0, . . . , n − 1} such that u([α]¬φ) = in . It follows that
τi/n(u([α]¬φ)) = u([α]τi/n(¬φ)) = 1 and so, that v(τi/n(¬φ)) = 1. It means
that v(¬φ) ≥ in or equivalently that v(φ) ≤ 1−
i
n < 1, a contradiction.
Proceed in a similar way to prove that the condition is sufficient. 
Note that since we have defined an accessibility relation for every pro-
gram α and the image of the valuation maps on every formula φ, it is not
clear that the canonical model is an n + 1-valued (non-standard) model.
Indeed, in (non-standard) models, valuations are defined on atomic objects
and inductively extended to all formulas.
The canonical model will actually turn out to be an n + 1-valued non
standard model. The following lemma is a major step in the proof of this
result. The proof of this lemma is given in more general settings in [16]. We
include a stand alone proof for the sake of readability.
Note that for any MV-homomorphism u : Fn → Łn, the set [α]
−1u−1(1)
is a filter of Fn since the formula [α](φ → ψ) → ([α]φ → [α]ψ) belongs to
PDLn for any program α and any formulas φ and ψ.
Lemma 5.11. If φ ∈, if α ∈ Π and if u ∈W c then
(5.7) Valc(u, [α]φ) =
∧
{Valc(v, φ) | v ∈ Rcαu}.
Proof. We have to prove that
(5.8) u([α]φ) =
∧
{v(φ) | v ∈ Rαu}.
First, assume that u([α]φ) = in for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It follows that
(5.9) 1 = τi/n(u([α]φ)) = u(τi/n([α]φ)) = u([α]τi/n(φ)),
where the first equality is obtained by definition of τi/n, the second one
holds because u is an MV-homomorphism and the last one from item (19) of
Proposition 2.3. Hence, for any v ∈ Rαu, we get v(τi/n(φ)) = τi/n(v(φ)) = 1,
which means that v(φ) ≥ in . We have proved that
(5.10) u([α]φ) ≤
∧
{v(φ) | v ∈ Rαu}.
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For the other inequality, assume ad absurdum that there is an i ≤ n such
that
(5.11) u([α]φ) <
i
n
≤
∧
{v(φ) | v ∈ Rαu},
i.e., such that u([α]τi/n(φ)) 6= 1 and v(τi/n(φ)) = 1 for any v ∈ Rαu. Note
that the definition of Rα means that the maximal filters above [α]
−1u−1(1)
are exactly the v−1(1) where v belongs to Rαu. Hence, the element τi/n(φ)
belongs to any maximal filter that contains [α]−1u−1(1) but is not an element
of [α]−1u−1(1), a contradiction. 
Theorem 5.12. The canonical model of PDLn is an n+1-valued non stan-
dard Kripke model.
Proof. We prove the following properties of the canonical model.
(1) R[α∪β] = Rα ∪Rβ,
(2) Rα;β = Rα ◦Rβ ,
(3) Rψ? = {(u, u) | Val(u, ψ) = 1},
(4) Rα∗ is reflexive, transitive and contains Rα,
(5) M |= {[α∗]φ↔ (φ∧[α][α∗]φ), (φ∧[α∗](φ→ [α]φ)n)→ [α∗]φ, [α]∗φ→
[α∗][α∗]φ}.
For (1), we note that the inequality Rα ∪ Rβ ⊆ Rα∪β is trivial. For the
other inequality, let us assume that (u, v) belongs to Rα∪β but not to Rα∪Rβ.
There are formulas φ and ψ such that Val(u, [α]φ) = 1, Val(u, [β]ψ) = 1 and
Val(v, φ ∨ ψ) < 1. Then, thanks to Lemma 5.11,
(5.12) Val(u, [γ](φ ∨ ψ)) ≥ Val(u, [γ]φ ∨ [γ]ψ)) = 1,
for γ ∈ {α, β}. Hence,
(5.13) Val(u, [α ∪ β](φ ∨ ψ)) = Val(u, [α](φ ∨ ψ) ∧ [β](φ ∨ ψ)) = 1
while Val(v, φ∨ψ) < 1. We conclude that (u, v) does not belong to Rα∪β , a
contradiction.
The inequality Rα ◦ Rβ ⊆ Rα;β of (2) is clear. Let us prove the other
inequality. Assume that (u, v) ∈ Rα;β . We prove that the filter gener-
ated by [α]−1u−1(1) ∪ 〈β〉v−1(1) is a proper filter of Fn. Assume that
φ1, . . . , φk belong to [α]
−1u−1(1), that ψ1, . . . , ψl belong to v
−1(1) and that
ǫ1, . . . , ǫk, η1, . . . , ηl are nonnegative integers. We prove that
(5.14) Φ⊙Ψ 6= 0
where Φ denotes the formula φǫ11 ⊙ · · · ⊙ φ
ǫk
k and Ψ the formula (〈β〉ψ1)
η1 ⊙
· · · ⊙ (〈β〉ψl)
ηl .
Let us denote by Ψ′ the formula ψη11 ⊙ · · · ⊙ ψ
ηl
l . Since (u, v) belongs to
Rα;β and v(Ψ
′) = 1 we obtain thanks to Lemma 5.10 that u(〈α;β〉Ψ′) = 1. It
follows that u([α]Φ⊙〈α〉〈β〉Ψ′) = 1 and hence, according to Lemma 2.3 (16)
that u(〈α〉(Φ ⊙ 〈β〉Ψ′)) = 1. Then, according to Lemma 5.11 and Remark
4.2,
(5.15) u(〈α〉(Φ ⊙ 〈β〉Ψ′)) =
∨
{w(Φ ⊙ 〈β〉Ψ′) | w ∈ Rαu}.
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Hence, there is a w in Rαu such that w(Φ⊙〈β〉Ψ
′) = 1 which proves that
Φ ⊙ 〈β〉Ψ′ 6= 0 in Fn. It follows from Lemma 2.3 (18) that (Φ ⊙ 〈β〉Ψ
′) →
(Φ⊙Ψ) is a theorem of PDLn wich implies that
(5.16) Φ⊙Ψ ≥ Φ⊙ 〈β〉Ψ′ > 0
in Fn which is the desired conclusion.
(3) Thanks to axiom [q?]p↔ ¬qn∨p and the rule of uniform substitution,
we obtain that (u, v) ∈ Rψ? if either u(ψ) < 1 and v(φ) = 1 for any φ ∈ Fn
(which is impossible since v−1(1) is a proper filter of Fn) or u(ψ) = 1 and
u−1(1) ⊆ v−1(1), which means that v = u by maximality.
(4) Let us prove that Rα ⊆ Rα∗ . Assume that (u, v) ∈ Rα and that
u([α∗]φ) = 1 for some φ ∈ Fn. Thanks to the axioms that define the operator
∗, it means that u(φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ) = 1. It follows that u([α][α∗]φ) = 1. Since
(u, v) ∈ Rα we deduce that v([α
∗]φ) = 1, hence that v(φ∧ [α][α∗]φ) = 1 and
finaly that v(φ) = 1.
Eventually, reflexivity and transitivity of Rα∗ are easily obtained.
(5) is obtained by construction. 
Theorem 5.13. The logic PDLn is complete with respect to the n+1-valued
Kripke models.
Proof. If φ is a tautology, then φ is valid in [Mc]φ which is an n+ 1-valued
Kripke model. It follows from Lemma 5.4 that φ is true in Mc. We thus
conclude that φ is in any maximal filter of Fn, i.e. that φ ≡ 1 and thus that
φ is a theorem of PDLn. 
6. Concluding remarks
This paper deals with some theoretical issues of a many-valued generaliza-
tion of PDL. We believe that this generalization could reveal to be a valuable
tool for analysis of problems arising from various fields such as computer sci-
ence, epistemic logic or game theory. We present a few ideas about possible
areas in which this new language could be applied or generalized.
6.1. Distributed algorithms. Some of the problems that can be solved by
a distributed or parallel algorithm could be modeled with the language of
PDLn.
Consider as a toy example the problem of encoding a string w of length 2n
over an alphabet Σ into an alphabet Σ′ using a coding function c : Σ2 → Σ′∗.
Assume that this task is distributed over two processes P1 and P2 and that
P1 starts encoding from the head of the string and P2 starts from its tail.
Let us consider two propositional variables p1 and p2 that are evaluated
at each step u of the algorithm as Val(u, pi) = ki/n where for any i ∈ {1, 2},
ki denotes the number of substrings of length 2 that process Pi has already
encoded in step u. The algorithm can be modeled by a many-valued Kripke
model. It terminates in step u if Val(u, p1 ⊕ p2) = 1.
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6.2. Dynamic epistemic logic. In [30], the authors show how to use the
language of PDL to design a dynamic epistemic logic LLC for multi-agent sys-
tems that allows to deal with different kinds of information changes (public
announcements, subgroup announcements, partial observations. . . ) or fac-
tual changes in the state of the world. In their settings, agents are repre-
sented by elements of Π0 and the program operators ’;’, ’∪’ and ’
∗’ have
epistemic interpretations (for example [a; b]φ is read ‘agent a knows that
agent b knows φ’). Their semantic uses two kind of models: epistemic mod-
els (which are standard Kripke models for PDL) and update models used
to capture information changes. It also provides rules to update the former
with the latter. The generalization of these constructions to a many-valued
realm, using the language and the Kripke models introduced in this paper,
could help to model situations involving partial or shared knowledge.
6.3. Modal logic for games. Modal logic turned out to be a valuable tool
to study several kinds of game forms ([26]). For example, Pauly introduced
in [25] a logic, called CLN to reason about effective power in coalitional games
(with set of players N). A set of outcome states X is effective for a coalition
C ⊆ N if the players in C can choose a joint strategy that leads to a state
in X no matter which strategies are adopted by the players not belonging to
C. CLN is a multi-modal logic that is complete for a class of neighborhood
models. Some of the tools introduced in this paper could be used to set up a
generalization of CLN designed to capture the degree with which a coalition
C can encompass a fuzzy set of outcome states.
Appendix A. Proof of the Filtration Lemma
Definition A.1 ([9]). Assume that X is a set of formulas. The Fisher-
Ladner closure FL(X) of X is the smallest subset Y of such that
(1) X ⊆ Y ,
(2) φ ∈ Y if ¬φ ∈ Y ,
(3) {φ,ψ} ⊆ Y if φ→ ψ ∈ Y ,
(4) φ ∈ Y if [α]φ ∈ Y ,
(5) [α][β]φ ∈ Y if [α;β]φ ∈ Y ,
(6) {[α]φ, [β]φ}⊆Y if [α ∪ β]φ ∈
Y ,
(7) [α][α∗]φ ∈ Y if [α∗]φ ∈ Y ,
(8) {ψ, φ} ⊆ Y if [ψ?]φ ∈ Y .
Lemma A.2. If 〈W,R,Val〉 is a weak non-standard n + 1-valued model,
if φ ∈ and if E is a subset of W which is ≡φ-saturated ( i.e., E contains
[u]φ whenever it contains u), then there is a formula ΨE such that E =
Val−1(·,ΨE)(1).
Proof. For any [t] ∈ [W ], any ρ ∈ FL(φ) and any i ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that
Val([t], ρ) = in , let us denote by Iρ,[t] the formula I i
n
(ρ). Then, set
(A.1) ψ[t] =
∧
ρ∈FL(φ)
Iρ,[t].
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Then u ∈ [t] if and only if Val(u, ψ[t]) = 1. The formula
(A.2) ψE =
∨
[t]⊆E
ψ[t].
has the desired property. 
Lemma A.3. Assume that M is a non-standard Kripke model and that
φ ∈ and α ∈ Π. If M |= (φ→ [α]φ)n then M |= φ→ [α∗]φ.
Proof. Remark (5.1) states that axioms and rules of PDLn are sound in non-
standard Kripke frames. Lemma 4.5 states that φ→ [α∗]φ can be obtained
from (φ → [α]φ)n by applications of axioms and rules of PDLn. If follows
that if M |= (φ→ [α]φ)n then M |= φ→ [α∗]φ. 
We now provide the proof of the Filtration Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5.4. The proofs of (1) and (2) are done by mutual induction.
(1) If ψ ∈ Prop, the result follows directly from the definition of [M]. If
ψ = ρ → µ or ψ = ¬ρ, the result follows by applying induction hypothesis
to ρ and µ.
If ψ = [α]ρ ∈ FL(φ) then ρ ∈ FL(φ). We have to prove that
(A.3) Val(u, [α]ρ) = Val([u], [α]ρ).
First, we prove inequality ≤. We obtain successively
Val(u, [α]ρ) ≤
∧
{Val(v, ρ) | ([u], [v]) ∈ Rα}(A.4)
=
∧
{Val([v], ρ) | ([u], [v]) ∈ Rα}(A.5)
= Val([u], [α]ρ),(A.6)
where (A.4) and (A.5) are obtained by (2) (b) and by induction hypothesis
for ρ.
Now, we prove inequality ≥ in (A.3). From (2)(a) we obtain that R
[M]
α
contains ([u], [v]) whenever (u, v) ∈ Rα. It follows that
Val([u], [α]ρ) =
∧
{Val([v], ρ) | ([u], [v]) ∈ Rα}(A.7)
=
∧
{Val(v, ρ) | ([u], [v]) ∈ Rα}(A.8)
≤
∧
{Val(v, ρ) | (u, v) ∈ Rα}(A.9)
= Val(u, [α]ρ),(A.10)
where (A.8) is obtained by induction hypothesis. Hence, we have proved
(A.3).
(2) There are five cases to consider according to the form of α.
If α ∈ Π0 then, knowing that [α]ψ and ψ are in FL(φ), the result follows
easily from the definition of [M].
If α = β ∪ γ then (a) is easily obtained by application of induction hy-
pothesis to [α]ψ and [β]ψ and the fact that R[β∪γ] = Rβ ∪ Rγ in any (non
standard) n + 1-valued Kripke model. For (b), assume that ([u], [v]) ∈
R[β∪γ] = R[β]∪R[γ]. We apply induction hypothesis to [β]ψ and [γ]ψ and we
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obtain that either Val(u, [β]ψ) ≤ Val(v, ψ) or Val(u, [γ]ψ) ≤ Val(v, ψ). The
result is then obtained thanks to item (1) of Proposition 2.3.
If α = β; γ, we can proceed in a similar way by application of induction
hypothesis to [β][γ]ψ, [γ]ψ ∈ FL(φ).
If α = ρ? then ρ ∈ FL(φ) and we obtain by (1) that Val(u, ρ) = Val([u], ρ),
which gives a proof of (a). For (b), we note that if ([u], [u]) ∈ Rρ? then
1 = Val([u], ρ) = Val(u, ρ) thanks to (1) applied to ρ ∈ FL(φ). It follows
that
(A.11) Val(u, [ρ?]ψ) = Val(u,¬ρn ∨ ψ) = Val(u, ψ).
If α = β∗ then [β][β∗]ψ ∈ FL(φ) and we can apply the induction hypoth-
esis to Rβ. To prove (a), assume that (u, v) ∈ Rβ∗ . Let us consider
(A.12) E = {t ∈W | ([u], [t]) ∈ Rβ∗}.
The set E is clearly ≡φ-saturated. By Lemma A.2, there exists a formula
ΨE such that E = Val(·,ΨE)
−1(1).
Since R[M]β∗ is a reflexive extension of R
[M]
β , it follows that u belongs to E.
Now, assume that s ∈ E and that sRβt. By induction hypothesis, we
obtain that ([s], [t]) is in R[M]β . Then ([u], [t]) is in R
[M]
β∗ since this relation
is a transitive extension of R[M]β . Hence M |= (Ψ
n
E → [β]Ψ
n
E)
n. By Lemma
A.3 it follows that M |= ΨnE → [β
∗]ΨnE . As u ∈ E, we conclude that
Val(u,ΨnE) = 1 so that Val(u, [β
∗]ΨnE) = 1 and Val(v,Ψ
n
E) = 1 since (u, v) ∈
Rβ∗ . Thus, we have proved that ([u], [v]) ∈ R
[M]
β∗ .
To prove (b), assume that ([u], [v]) ∈ Rβ∗ . Then, since R
[M]
β∗ is the reflexive
and transitive closure of Rβ, there are some [wi] (i ∈ {0, . . . ,m+1}) in [M]
such that ([wi], [wi+1]) ∈ Rβ for any i ≤ m and such that [u] = [w0] and
[v] = [wm+1]. We obtain by induction hypothesis that for any i ≤ m,
(A.13) Val(wi, [β
∗]ψ) ≤ Val(wi, ψ ∧ [β][β
∗]ψ) ≤ Val(wi+1, [β
∗]ψ).
Hence, we eventually obtain that Val(u, [β∗]ψ) ≤ Val(v, ψ). 
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